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Abstract
Observation equivalence holds in the hyperbolic discounting models such as Laibson (1996),
Barro (1999), and Krusell et al (2002). We study a hyperbolic discounting model where the
policy function cannot be replicated by a geometric discounting model. Under the
logarithmic utility and Cobb−Douglas production, we obtain the explicit solution for
consumer's consumption−saving decision. Different from the literatures of exponential
discounting, our model shows that the habit persistence affects consumer's
consumption−saving decision. Therefore, observational equivalence does not hold in our
hyperbolic discounting model.
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Abstract
Observation equivalence holds in the hyperbolic discounting models such as Laib-
son (1996), Barro (1999), and Krusell et al (2002). We study a hyperbolic discount-
ing model where the policy function cannot be replicated by a geometric discounting
model. Under the logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production, we obtain the
explicit solution for consumer’s consumption-saving decision. Diﬀerent from the
literatures of exponential discounting, our model shows that the habit persistence
aﬀects consumer’s consumption-saving decision. Therefore, observational equiva-
lence does not hold in our hyperbolic discounting model.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since Strotz (1956), the hyperbolic discounting has become an important tool to dis-
cuss the time-inconsistent decision-makings in economics, especially in the theory of
consumer’s consumption decision. For example, Laibson (1996), Barro (1999), and
Krusell et al (2002) have studied consumer’s consumption-saving decision in vari-
ous hyperbolic discounting models. However, the observational equivalence, which
means that the consumption-saving decision in a hyperbolic discounting model is
equivalent to those in a model with some standard exponential discounting rate, has
been proved true in these literatures. Thus, we cannot distinguish the hyperbolic
discounting from standard exponential discounting with the aid of these literatures.
Therefore, whether we can ﬁnd a model to distinguish the hyperbolic discounting
from the exponential discounting needs to be studied further. This paper tries to ﬁll
the gap to set up a model to distinguish the hyperbolic discounting from standard
exponential discounting.
This paper introduces the habit persistence into the hyperbolic discounting
model. With the help of the eﬀect of habit persistence on consumer’s consumption-
saving decision, we can obtain a policy function, which cannot be replicated by a
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1standard geometric discounting model. For the speciﬁed utility function and produc-
tion function, the explicit solution for consumption-saving decision has been derived.
Diﬀerent from the standard exponential discounting, it is found that the habit per-
sistence aﬀects the consumer’s policy function in this paper, which can be used to
distinguish the hyperbolic discounting from the standard exponential discounting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We set up the basic hyperbolic
discounting model with the consideration of habit persistence in section 2. The
explicit solution for consumer’s consumption-saving decision has been derived in
this section. We conclude our paper in section 3.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic set up
We introduce the habit persistence into Krusell et al (2002) decentralized economy
model. The agent has a transitional habit formation. The agent’ instantaneous
utility at period t is speciﬁed as
u(ct,c t−1)=l o gct + γ logct−1,
where γ represents the extent to which the habit persistence inﬂuences the current
period utility, or the extent to which the agent’s memory of consumption in the last















where 0 <δ<1 and β>0 are positive constants, they represent the agent’s time
discounted rate.
The individual’s capital stock is kt and the aggregate capital stock of the economy
is kt. All the markets are perfectly competitive. The individual agent is a price-taker.
The aggregate capital stock kt is given as a constant for the individual. Thus, the
budget constraint for the agent can be written as:
ct + kt+1 = r(kt)kt + w(kt), (1)
where r(kt) and w(kt) are the interest rate and the wage rate, respectively.
Under the quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the agent’s discounted utility at time t
c a nb ew r i t t e na s




where u(ct,c t−1) is the instantaneous utility function of the agent; 0 <δ<1 and
β>0 are positive constants, they represent the agent’s time discounted rate. When
β =1 , the agent has standard geometric preferences; When 0 <β<1, the agent
2has excessive short-run impatience; When β>1, the agent has excessive short-run
patience.
Under the budget constraint (1), the agent chooses the consumption-saving de-
cision to maximize the discounted utility in equation (2). Output is produced by
the neoclassical production function f(kt). In the perfectly competitive market, the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization presents that
rt = f0(kt),w t = f(kt) − f0(kt)kt, (3)
which mean that the marginal productivity of capital equals the interest rate, rt,
and the marginal productivity of labor equals the wage, wt. In order to obtain the




where A and 0 <α<1 are constants. The capital is fully depreciated.
2.2 Recursive competitive equilibrium and explicit solutions
In this subsection, we derive the explicit solution for the recursive competitive equi-
librium. Similar to Krusell et al (2002), our model suppose that the agent makes
his decision taking as given the prices as functions of the aggregate state k, r(k)
and w(k), and a law of motion for aggregate capital, k
0
= G(c−1,k), and the other
individuals’ decision rule of saving; k0 = g(k,c−1,k). The recursive equilibrium re-
quires three state variables for the individual: the individual current capital, k,t h e
individual’s last period consumption, c−1, and the aggregate current capital, k.T h e
middle one represents the habit while the last one reﬂects prices. The current self
solves the following problem at time t
V0(k,c−1,k)=m a x
c,k0 {u(r(k)k + w(k) − k0)+βδV(k0,c,k
0
)}, (4)
where V (k,c−1,k) satisﬁes
V (k,c−1,k)=u(r(k)k + w(k) − g(k,c−1,k)) + δV(g(k,c−1,k),c,k
0
).( 5 )
The solution to optimization problem (4) is given by e g(k,c−1,k),a n dt h ec o r -
responding law of motion for aggregate capital is e G(c−1,k). We have a solution to
the agent’s game (i.e., to the game between the diﬀerent selves) if the ﬁxed-point
conditions e g(k,c−1,k)=g(k,c−1,k) and G(c−1,k)= e G(c−1,k) are satisﬁed for all
k, c−1, c−1and k.T h e r e f o r e ,
Deﬁnition 1: A recursive competitive equilibrium for the economic system con-
sists of a decision rule, g(k,c−1,k), a value function, V (k,c−1,k), pricing functions
r(k) and w(k), and a law of motion for aggregate capital, k
0
= G(c−1,k), such that
1. Given V (k,c−1,k), g(k,c−1,k) solves the maximization problem (4) and
V (k,c−1,k) satisﬁes the functional equation (5);
32. r(k) and w(k) maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, i.e., r(k)=f0(k) and w(k)=
f(k) − kf0(k);
3. The law of motion for aggregate capital derived from the current self’s deci-
sion is consistent with the law of motion for aggregate capital; i.e., g(k,c−1,k)=
G(c−1,k).
Solving problems (4) and (5), we arrive
Proposition 1. The recursive competitive equilibrium is given by:
















Proof. See the Appendix A.
From proposition 1, we can easily derive the explicit solutions for consumption
and investment decisions:
ct =
(1 − δ)(1 + δβγ)
1 − δ + δβ + δβγ
αAk
α−1

















The standard exponential discounting model becomes a special case of our model.
Setting β =1in equations (6) and (7), we have
ct =( 1 − δ)αAk
α−1






From equations (9) and (10), we know that the individual’s decisions are indepen-
dent of the habit persistence parameter γ, i.e., the habit persistence does not aﬀect
the individual’s decisions in the standard exponential discounting model. However,
from equations (6) and (7), we ﬁnd that the habit persistence aﬀects the consumer’s
consumption-saving decision. Therefore, if we can observe the habit persistence pa-
rameter γ, the observational equivalence between the hyperbolic discounting and
exponential discounting would not hold yet. This is a critical point that we can
be used to distinguish the hyperbolic discounting from the standard exponential
discounting.
This result cannot be obtained in a hyperbolic discounting model without habit
persistence. Observational equivalence always holds in that case. When γ =0 ,
4equations (6) and (7) are reduced to
ct =( 1 −
δβ
1 − δ + δβ
)αAk
α−1









which are the results presented by Krusell et al (2002). A model under the standard
exponential discounting with discount rate δ0 can replicate the policy function of the
model with the hyperbolic discounting, where
δ0 =
δβ
1 − δ + δβ
.
This is exactly the observational equivalence between the hyperbolic discounting
model and the standard discounting model. This equivalence result holds for both
aggregate and individual variables.
2.3 Implication for the empirical test for hyperbolic discounting
From the discussion above, we know that the habit persistence will aﬀect consumer’s
consumption-saving decision in the model with hyperbolic discounting, while it does
not aﬀect the consumer’s decision in the model with standard discounting. There-
fore, we can use it to set up an empirical test to distinguish the hyperbolic discount-
ing from the standard exponential discounting. Similar to Garcia, Renault, and
Semenov (2002), we can test the saving rate of diﬀerent countries, controlling other
factors and varying the habit persistence factor, to ﬁnd the evidence of the exis-
tence of the hyperbolic discounting. If the hypothesis of the existence of hyperbolic
discounting is true, we should ﬁnd that people who have diﬀerent habit persistence
parameter γ have diﬀerent saving rates. On the other hand, if people with diﬀerent
habit persistence have the same saving rate, the hypothesis of the existence of hy-
perbolic discounting is rejected and the opposite hypothesis of the existence of the
exponential discounting could not be rejected. This will leave for further research.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we introduce habit persistence into Laibson (1996) and Krusell et al
(2002)’s model to examine the eﬀects of hyperbolic discounting and habit persistence
on consumption and investment decisions. For the speciﬁed utility function and pro-
duction function, we derive the explicit solutions for the consumption and invest-
ment decisions and ﬁnd that both habit persistence and hyperbolic discounting aﬀect
consumer’s consumption-saving decision. The marginal propensity to consumption
depends on the parameters of habit persistence and hyperbolic discounting. There-
fore, if the habit persistence is observed, the observational equivalence in Laibson
(1996), Barro (1999), and Krusell et al (2002) will not hold yet in this paper. This
5helps us to set up empirical methods to distinguish the hyperbolic discounting from
the standard exponential discounting.
Further researches should set up econometric models to implement this theoret-
ical method and test the eﬀects of hyperbolic discounting on economy.
4 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove the proposition 1, we postulate the forms for the value function
and the law of motion for aggregate capital as




where a, b, e, and d are to be determined.








Subsitituting this decision rule into equation (5), we have d = γ, e =
1+δγ
1−δ , b =
(1+δγ)(α−1)
(1−δ)(1−αδ), ϕ = 1−α
α−s.
Substituting ϕ = 1−α
α−s into the individual’s decision rules and setting g(k,c−1,k)=
G(c−1,k),w eo b t a i ns =
δβ(1+δγ)α
1−δ+δβ+δβγ and ϕ =
δβe−(1+δβd)sϕ
1+δβe+δβd .T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v et h e
explicit solution for g(k,c−1,k) and G(c−1,k).
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